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1THE PLOTINIAN REDUCTION OF ARISTOTLE * S CATEGORIES
By
Christos C. Evangeliou 
Towson State University
I
In Ennead VI. 3., Plotinus proposed a fivefold set of 
categories which, he thought, can sufficiently account for the 
sensible world, unlike the tenfold Aristotelian set which he 
sharply criticized, especially in VI. 1., as ontologically 
inadequate and logically redundant.1 He found it necessary to 
criticize the Aristotelians in this way because, inter alia, "In 
their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible 
beings."2 In view of the fundamental (for the pure Platonists) 
distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds, 
Plotinus’ charge means that Aristotle erred in directing his 
inquiries towards the latter to the neglect of the former which, 
nevertheless, comprises "the most important beings."3 Since
Aristotle’s categories fail to function as "genera of Being,"4 in 
Plotinus’ view, they lose to Plato’s megista gene as presented in 
Sophist 254a-256e and elaborated in Ennead VI. 2.5
Had Plotinus written the treatises of VI. 1. and VI. 2., but
not VI. 3.,6 he would have perhaps proven himself a faithful 
follower of Plato and a capable defender of Platonism.7 He would 
have perhaps shown why the Aristotelian (and the Stoic for that 
matter) set of categories are inapplicable to the intelligible 
realm of real Being, as the Platonists understood it. But he 
would have left a gap in his philosophical system by not 
providing a catégorial account for the sensible world, especially 
because he was not prepared to accept the same set of categories 
for the realm of real Being and the realm of mere becoming.8
By proposing a new set of categories for the sensible world, 
Plotinus decided to go beyond Plato and challenge Aristotle and 
the Stoics in their field of expertise, this sensible world.9 
With regard to Aristotle’s categories, his central claim is that, 
even when restricted to this field, it is in need of a drastic 
reduction and Platonic modification, as we will see presently.10 
Thus the proposed Plotinian set numerically corresponds to 
Plato’s five megista gene, though in terminology it clearly 
resembles Aristotle’s set of categories, reduced and modified.
Given the significance of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories 
in shaping our philosophical tradition and its relevance in 
contemporary methodological debates,11 the arguments of Plotinus 
in rejecting or replacing certain Aristotelián categories cannot 
fail to be of interest to us. For the most part, the Plotinian 
arguments are philosophically challenging, though occasionally 
complex and difficult to follow.12 There is no doubt, however, 
that Plotinus was seriously concerned with the problem of 
determining the number and explaining the nature of the 
categories of becoming as opposed to the genera of Being.13
In order to be able to follow Plotinus’ strategy with some
2understanding, it will be helpful to keep in mind the following 
facts and important distinctions: (1) That in VI. 3., Plotinus
searches for a new set of categories of becoming and not for 
genera of Being which he had discussed and determined in VI. 2.;
(2) that for Plotinus the term genos as opposed to the term 
katêgoria, as well as the term ousia as opposed to the term 
genesis, are reserved for the intelligible realm of real Being as 
opposed to the sensible realm of mere becoming;14 (3) that the 
two realms are related to each other as archetype to its image;15 
and (4) that, as a result of this ontological relation, the 
danger of homonymy is permanently present in any attempt to think 
and to speak logically about the entities and the activities of 
each of these two, ontologically distinct, domains.16
In this context, I propose to consider the Plotinian 
reduction of Aristotle’s categories, especially as presented in 
the problematic VI. 3. 3. The following questions will be
discussed: Which of the Aristotelian categories did Plotinus
consider dispensable and for what specific reasons? Are there 
any non-Aristotelian categories in the Plotinian set and, if so, 
where do they come from and how do they function? By what 
method, if any, did Plotinus determine the number of his set of 
categories and why just five? Finally, why is it that Plotinus 
is the last, in a long series of Platonists, to sharply criticize 
Aristotle’s doctrine of categories? For it is known that his 
followers and admirers became increasingly interested in (and 
commented favorably on) Aristotle’s categories. With this in 
mind, we may now turn to the relevant texts for enlightenment.
II
According to Porphyry’s division and thematic arrangement of 
the Enneads, the treatise of VI. 3. comprises twenty-eight 
chapters of which the first three are devoted to preliminary 
investigations leading to the specification of the definite 
number of categories of becoming, while the remaining chapters 
are proportionally allocated to the discussion of each category 
in accordance with their relative merit. Of the introductory 
chapters, the most important for our purposes is the third 
chapter, that is, VI. 3. 3. It is here that Plotinus attempts to 
answer certain fundamental aporiai. which were raised in the two 
previous chapters, and to provide us with some clues about the 
method by which he arrived at his fivefold catégorial list.17
For example, Plotinus states that, having completed the 
investigation of kosmos noêtos in the treatise VI. 2. and having 
ascertained the need for new "genera" or, rather, categories for 
kosmos aistheTtos, he will turn his attention to the realm of 
genesis which, unlike the realm of ousia, is something syntheton 
because it is composed of matter and form.18 But he insists that 
the search for categories of the sensible realm should leave out 
of consideration the formal aspect of this realm as an alien 
element: "Just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of
a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance,
3left the resident foreigners out of account" (VI. 3. 1. 26-28).
Next, Plotinus explains that he will use the term ousia to 
refer to the sensible "so-called substance."19 For Plotinus any 
sensible substance is only homonymously called ousia and it would 
be preferable, he suggests, if we could follow the author of the 
Timaeus (27Dff) and call it instead genesis (VI. 3. 2. 1-5).
Since this sensible so-called substance can be divided into 
bodies and their incidentals or consequences,20 Plotinus sees two 
distinct approaches to the problem of devising an adequate 
catégorial scheme, the analytical and the analogical approach.
According to Plotinus, philosophical analysis shows that 
sensible objects are composed of matter (hylë) and form (eidos). 
However, he immediately proceeds to raise the following questions 
in a clearly Aristotelian manner:
But what is the common factor of matter and form? For what 
essential differentiation is there belonging to matter? But 
in what genus is the product of both to be ranked? If the 
product of both is itself bodily substance, and each of them 
is not a body, how could they be ranked in one and the same 
genus with the composite? (VI. 3. 2, 10-14)
As for the analogical approach, Plotinus considers it
briefly but he rejects it on the ground that the differences
between the intelligible and the sensible realms are much greater 
than any similarities to warrant reliable results. For instance, 
it is possible to consider the matter and form of sensible
objects as playing here below the roles which ousia and kinesis 
respectively and authentically play in the intelligible world. 
But this analogy would not work to Plotinus* satisfaction:
Now, first of all, matter does not hold or grasp form as its 
life and activity, but form comes upon it from elsewhere and 
is not one of matter’s possessions. Then, in the
intelligible the form is activity and motion, but here below 
motion is something else and an incident: but form is rather 
matter’s rest and a kind of quietness for it limits matter 
which is unlimited. (VI. 3. 2, 22-27)21
Having thus found both approaches, the analytical and the
analogical, unsatisfactory, Plotinus tries a new approach in VI.
3. 3, as follows :
But let us explain how we should divide: this is the way to 
begin with; it is one thing to be matter, another to be 
form, another to be the composite of both, and another to be 
the peripheral characteristics:22 and of these peripheral 
characteristics, some are only predicated, some are also 
incidental: and of the incidentals some are in those three, 
[matter, form, and composite], but in other cases these
4three are in the incidentals; others are their activities, 
others their passive affections, and others consequences. 
And matter is common and in all the substances, but is 
certainly not a genus, because it has no essential 
differences, unless one understood the differences as one 
part having a fiery shape and one the shape of air. But if 
one was satisfied with what is common, that there is matter 
in all existing things, or that it is like a whole in 
relation to parts, it would be a genus in another sense: and 
this would be one element, and an element can be a genus. 
But the form, with the addition "about matter" or "in 
matter," separates from the other forms, but does not 
include all substantial form. But if we mean by form that 
which makes substance, and by rational formative principle 
that which is substantial according to the form, we have not 
yet said how substance is to be understood. But as for that 
composed of both [matter and form] if this alone is 
substance, matter and form are not substances: but if they 
are also this, we must investigate what they have in 
common.23 But the characteristics which are only predicated 
would come under relation, being a cause or being an element 
for instance. And the incidental characteristics in the 
three would be quantitative or qualitative, in so far as 
they are in them; as for the cases where the three are in 
the incidentals, this would be like place and time;24 their 
activities and passive affections would be like movements; 
their consequences like place and time, the place a 
consequence of the composites, the time of the movement. 
But the three will go into one, if we can find something 
common, the ambiguous .substance here below: then the others 
will follow in order, relation, quantity, quality, in place, 
in time, movement, place, time. Or, if one leaves out place 
and time, "in place" and "in time" are superfluous, so that 
there aré five,25 on the assumption that the first three are 
one: but if the first three do not go into one, there will 
be matter, form, composite, relation, quantity, quality, 
movement. Or these last also could go into relation: for it 
is more inclusive. (VI. 3. 3. 1-31)26
Regarding the correct interpretation of .this admittedly 
difficult passage, two general observations would seem to be in 
order before we come to consider specific points of interest. 
First, it is evident that Plotinus had to take the sensible so- 
called substance as the starting point for his theorizing about 
the categories of becoming, in spite of all the reservations 
which he had expressed in the previous chapters. Second, his 
analysis of the sensible so-called substance is twofold: (1) In
terms of matter, form, and the composite; (2) in terms of its 
"peripheral characteristics," as Armstrong periphrastically 
renders the cryptic expression of the text, peri tauta.27
It should be noted here that the peri tauta are first 
identified by Plotinus in general (and not always Aristotelian)
5terms such as katêgoroumena (predicables), symbebekota (accidents 
or accidentals), energëmata (activities), parakolouthemata 
(consequences), paths (passions or affections); then, they are 
assigned more specific names which are taken from Aristotle’s 
catégorial nomenclature, as the attached Tables A and B indicate.
Ill
A comparative examination of the tentative Plotinian lists 
of categories, especially the fivefold list which was finally 
adopted, with the traditional Aristotelian tenfold list yields 
some very interesting results. To begin with, perhaps the most 
striking difference between the two lists is their respective 
lengths. The Aristotelian list has twice as many members as the 
Plotinian list. Clearly Plotinus thought of half of Aristotle’s 
categories as unnecessary, redundant and reducible. What his 
reasons for such a drastic reduction were is a question which 
must be carefully considered but it cannot be answered 
satisfactorily before we have (1) identified those Aristotelian 
categories which were left out of the Plotinian list and (2) have 
seen how they functioned within the Aristotelian catégorial 
scheme. We will consider these points presently, but first 
something should be said about Plotinus* preference for five as 
the correct number of categories for the realm of becoming.
In this connection, it may be well to recall that at the 
beginning of the treatise, which is characteristically entitled 
On the Genera of Being. Plotinus had briefly discussed the 
various rival theories of his predecessors regarding the number 
of the kinds of onta. that is, one being or many beings either 
infinite or finite in number.28 Without much argument Plotinus 
rejected both extreme positions, the Parmenidean absolute unity 
of being and the Democritian infinite multiplicity of beings.29 
Showing awareness of later developments in Hellenic philosophy 
regarding the correct solution to this problem, Plotinus asserted 
that the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Platonists all agreed 
on a finite number of "well defined genera."30 But they 
disagreed on the specific number of these "genera" or categories, 
since they had proposed four, ten, and five, respectively.31 In 
this light, Plotinus appears as if he sought to uphold a Platonic 
tradition by opting for a fivefold scheme of categories of 
becoming in correspondence to the five genera of Being.32 
However, as we will see in the next section, be had other and 
more philosophical reasons for drastically reducing the number of 
Aristotle’s categories.33
A second characteristic of Plotinus’ catégorial analysis is 
that he devotes much space to the discussion of matter and form 
as prospective categories of becoming distinct from the 
composite. In three of his tentative lists, matter and form are 
listed separately as if they were different from the category of 
the so-called substance. The reason for this uncertainty about 
the components of sensible substance is that the term ousia had 
been used by Aristotle to apply to the composite as well as to
6matter and form. Yet it is not clear to Plotinus what all these 
entities have in common to render such application ontologically 
legitimate.34 He asks poignantly:
What is it, then, which is the same in the three, and what 
will it be which makes them substance, the. substance in 
things here below? Is it a kind of base for everything 
else? But matter is thought to be a base and "seat" for 
form, so that form will not be included in substance. And 
the composite is a base and seat for other things, so that 
the form with the matter will be a base for the composites, 
or at least for all that come after the composites, 
quantity, quality, movement for instance. (VI. 3. 4. 1-7)
Plotinus’ questioning pinpoints the dilemma which any
analysis of the sensible substance along Aristotelian lines must 
face. For if matter and form, as components of sensible
substance, were themselves substances, it would appear that the 
composite itself becomes a collection of substances. So it would 
not be one substance but many. On the other hand, if matter and 
form were not themselves substances, it would follow that 
sensible substances derive their substantiality from that which 
lacked it. In either case one is led to logical absurdities.35 
In an effort to overcome such difficulties, Plotinus toyed with 
the idea of positing form and matter as distinct categories.36
A third characteristic of the Plotinian catégorial scheme is 
that it comprises other Aristotelian categories, besides ousia. 
These are the three cardinal categories of poson (quantity), 
poion (quality), and pros ti (relation, relatives).37 To be sure 
the names are the same but the functions .of these categories are 
not always Aristotelian. For one thing, they seem to have been 
strongly colored by Stoic influence, especially in the case of 
quality.38 Then, as a matter of fact, Plotinus does have 
numerous objections to Aristotle’s divisions and stipulative 
characteristics of each of these categories.39 Furthermore,
Plotinus tends to cross over the boundaries of each category as 
defined by Aristotle in the Categories.
For instance, Plotinus treats quantity and quality as the 
only symbebekota which are said to be "in" the sensible so- 
called substance40 which, consequently, he defines as symphoresis 
hylës and poioteton, that is, "a coming together of matter and 
qualities."41 It is clear that in this definition the category 
of poion has absorbed that of poson♦ Besides, quality seems to 
have taken the place of the sensible form or eidos itself so that 
the composite is considered not as a tode ti (a this) in the 
Aristotelian nomenclature, but as a poion ti (a qualified 
something).42 In other words, he seems to question seriously the 
substantiality of Aristotle’s primary substances. Consider:
And the rational form [logos] of man is the being of 
’something’ but its product in the nature of body, being an 
image of the form, is rather a sort of ’something like.’43
7It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted 
picture, being colours and painter’s stuff, was called 
Socrates: in the same way, therefore, since there is a 
rational form according to which Socrates is, the
perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be 
Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations 
of those in the form: and this rational form in relation to 
the truest form of man is affected in the same way. And so 
much for that. (VI. 3. 15. 29-38)
The modern reader would prefer that Plotinus had said much 
more in clarifying the point which he tries to make in this 
difficult passage. Apparently he wants to distinguish between 
the logos of man and the logos of an individual human being, e.g. 
Socrates. But what the meaning of logos is, in the latter case, 
is not clear. If logos be interpreted as having the same meaning 
in both cases, it would seem to follow that Plotinus thought of 
individual substances as being definable, which is contrary to 
Aristotle’s position.44 Such an interpretation may lead to the 
further suggestion that Plotinus postulated "Forms" of 
individuals, as has been argued by some scholars.45
It is possible, however, that logos in the case of Socrates 
does not stand for definition but for description.46 In this 
case, the logos of man will give the ti esti (the-what-is-it) of 
the definiendum. while the logos of Socrates will qualify the td 
by the addition of a collection of poiotêtes in such a way that 
the whole product will become a poion ti. If this is a correct 
interpretation, then the meaning of the above-quoted passage can 
be captured by an analogy and rendered thus: As the picture of
Socrates stands to living Socrates so the logos (description) of 
Socrates stands to logos (definition) of man. The implication is 
that for Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, ontological priority must be 
given to the generic as opposed to the particular. On this, 
then, Plotinus is certainly closer to Plato than Aristotle was, 
at least when he wrote the Categories.4 7
Be this as it may, the important point for our purposes is 
that the categories of quantity and quality, which are prominent 
in Aristotle’s list, have been reduced to relation in at least 
one of Plotinus’ tentative lists. So is every other category 
except for ousia. Although Plotinus did not in the end adopt 
this twofold division, it is significant that he even suggested 
it because it serves as an indication of his tendency to raise 
the category of relation to its old Platonic status.48 Given its 
expansion and elevation to the second place, after ousia, in all 
the tentative lists of Plotinus, it comes as a surprise that this 
category is not discussed at any length in VI. 3.49 There is no 
need for us here to follow the details of Plotinus’ different 
treatment of the Aristotelian category of pros ti. since our 
purpose is to consider which of Aristotle’s categories Plotinus 
deemed reducible and for what reasons.50 To this question our 
attention should be turned next.
IV
8
From Table B it is evident that six Aristotelian categories 
are missing from the fivefold list which Plotinus adopted. They 
are: pou. pote, poiein. paschein. echein. and keisthai.51 Their 
omission is justified on the grounds that they are unnecessary 
either because they are reducible to other more fundamental 
categories or because they are replacible by other newly issued 
categories. It should be noted here, that even Aristotle had 
treated these categories only summarily in the Categories where 
lengthy discussions were devoted to the cardinal categories of 
ousia, poson. poion, and pros ti. In the very short chapter nine 
of the Categories, Aristotle (1) asserts that, the categories of 
poiein and paschein admit of contraries and degrees; (2) states 
that the category of keisthai relates to that of pros ti by means 
of paronymy only; and (3) concludes his discussion by saying that 
the meanings of the remaining categories of pote. pou, and echein 
are so apparent that "I need say no more than I said at the very 
beginning." Then he repeats the examples which he had used 
earlier to illustrate the meaning of each of these categories.52
Leaving aside the question of why Aristotle treated these 
categories in such a summary way, we will concentrate on the 
reasons for which Plotinus excluded them from his proposed set.
If we take them by pairs and start with the weakest of them all, 
then we will consider first the pair of keisthai and echein♦ It 
is the case that these two categories are absent from all 
enumerations of categories to be found dispersed throughout the 
Aristotelian corpus with the notable exceptions of Categories lb 
25-28 and Topics 103b 20-24.
Our first observation is that Plotinus does not refer to 
this fact in his criticism of these two categories. Nor does he 
pay any attention to the fact that Aristotle did not elaborate on 
these categories even when he mentioned them and even where such 
a discussion would be appropriate, in the Categories. Treating 
them as legitimate Aristotelian categories, he argues rigorously 
against their catégorial status (VI. 1. 23. 1-24).
Evidently having in mind the polysemy of echein as discussed 
by Aristotle in Categories 15b 18-25, Plotinus first asks to
paraphrase him: Why is it that having shoes or arms on should
make up a separate category, while having color, magnitude, a 
wife, a son, etc. does not? Then, anticipating the probable 
Peripatetic response that "the mode of having" is different in 
each of these cases, Plotinus is prepared to make a concession 
only in order to strike back by asking (not without irony): If 
"the mode of having," in having shoes on, is sufficient reason 
for accepting a separate category, what about taking them off or 
burning them? Should we postulate another category to account 
for cases like these?
Furthermore, restricting his consideration to the expression 
of "having on," Plotinus is able to argue along these lines: If
it is the "on" which makes necessary the postulation of another 
category to account for such facts as "having shoes on," then
9certainly more categories will be needed to cover cases like 
"having a table-cloth on" or "having a bed-spread over," since 
the mode of having differs depending on whether we talk about 
men, tables or beds. On the other hand, if the emphasis is not 
on the "on" but on "having," then why not, Plotinus wonders, 
place these cases of having where Aristotle had placed all 
hexeis?53
Finally, and more importantly for Plotinus' critique, in 
considering the category of echein and, as we will see, the 
category of keisthai. Aristotle gives the impression that he has 
forgotten what he had stated at the beginning of his treatise, 
that is, that the categories were supposed to be about hapla 
(simple) and aneu symplokês legomena (uncombined expressions) 
such as "man," "horse," "runs," "wins" and the like.54 But how 
is it possible, Plotinus argues, to consider as a simple entity, 
falling under the heading of one category, something as complex 
as "that-man-over-there-has-shoes-on?" In instances like this, 
Plotinus correctly sees two separate beings, a man and his shoes, 
related in a certain way. But, since the cardinal categories of 
ousia and pros ti had already been established by Aristotle, the 
introduction of echein as a new and separate category was a 
puzzle to Plotinus as it has been to many modern philosophers.55 
It might have puzzled Aristotle too, which would explain why he 
gradually dropped from his catégorial set echein and keisthai·
Regarding the category of keisthai. Plotinus has numerous 
objections which are similar to those which he advanced against 
echein (VI. 1. 24. 1-12). First, he observes that the examples
"sitting," "reclining" and the like, are not cases of keisthai 
simpliciter but of being positioned "in a certain way" (pos). 
For they indicate respectively that "something occupies a certain 
place in a certain way" and that "something is situated in such 
and such a way" (keitai en toiode schemati). Now, since for 
Aristotle (1) schemata (figures) are considered as one kind of 
quality (Categories 9b 11-24); (2) topos (place) is considered as 
one kind of quantity (Categories 4b 20-33); and (3) the 
categories of quantity and quality have been well-established, 
Plotinus sees no real need for the category of keisthai which 
could be reduced to them.
Secondly, Plotinus argues that, if expressions like "is 
seated" or "sits" (kathetai) indicate activity or passivity,56 in 
either case they can be accounted for by the categories of poiein 
and paschein. both of which are related and, in his view, 
ultimately reducible to kinesis. as we will see. If so, there is 
no need for the Aristotelian category of keisthai. since ousia. 
pros ti. poiein and paschein can very well perform the task which 
this strange category was supposed to fulfill. The same holds 
true for the next pair of categories, pote and pou which, in 
Plotinus’ view, can be reduced to chronos and topos respectively 
both of which Aristotle had classified as continuous quantities.
With regard to pote (time in which, when), under which fall 
such expressions as "yesterday," "last year," "tomorrow" and the 
like, Plotinus makes the following observations. If these
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expressions denote "parts of time," then they obviously belong to 
the same category as time and, therefore, they should be placed 
under quantity where Aristotle himself had placed chronos 
(Categories 4b 23-26).57 In the case that these expressions do 
not indicate just time but "time-when," Plotinus is prepared to 
argue that, in so far as "time-when" relates to time, we must 
account for it categorially in terms of time. However, in so far 
as "time-when" is considered as being a combination of two 
distinct entities, that is, time and that which is an activity in 
time or a durational event, then clearly we have not one but two 
categories which means that Aristotle’s criterion of catégorial 
simplicity is violated. Even if pote is construed as meaning 
"being-in-time," Aristotle would seem to run into all sorts Of 
difficulties involved or implied by the multivocity of this "in":
Why will not what is in a pot make another category, and why 
is not what is in matter something else, and what is in a 
substance something else, and the part in the whole, and the 
whole in the parts, and the genus in the species, and the 
species in the genus? And we shall have more categories. 
(VI. 1. 14. 20-24)
The last criticism evidently applies equally to the category 
of pou (place-in-which, somewhere). Since Plotinus’ questioning 
of pou parallels that of pote. we can afford to be brief here. 
His arguments are to the effect that expressions such as "in the 
Lyceum," "in Athens," "above," "below," and the like seem (1) to 
involve more than one category; (2) to be reducible to topos and 
ultimately to the Aristotelian category of quantity; and (3) to 
indicate a certain relation (schesis) "of this in that," and so 
they can be accounted for by the Plotinian category of pros ti. 
In any case, there is no real need for a new category of pou.
Turning next to the last pair of questionable Aristotelian 
categories, poiein (action, acting) and paschein (being acted 
upon, passion), we may note that they are treated somewhat 
differently than the other two pairs. In Plotinus* view these 
two categories are related to kinesis (motion, movement).58 The 
fact that Plotinus devoted many chapters to the discussion of 
this category is indicative of the importance of kinesis as a 
category of becoming in his set.59 The same fact makes it 
difficult for us to provide a detailed exposition here of 
Plotinus* many arguments in support of this non-Aristotelian 
category which he thought was needed. It will suffice to point 
out only some of the arguments which Plotinus adduced to justify 
the replacement of the Aristotelian categories of poiein and 
paschein by the Platonic genus of kinesis. To better understand 
the disagreement of Plotinus and Aristotle on this important 
point it will be necessary to briefly recall how the Stagirite 
conceived of kinesis and why he excluded it from his categories.
The third Book of Physics is perhaps the best place in the 
Aristotelian corpus to look for enlightenment on this matter. 
There physis is defined as "the principle of movement and change"
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(200b 12-13). One kind of pros ti is identified as "that which 
is active and that which is acted on, and generally . . . that
which moves (or changes) something as the agent and that which 
is moved (or changed) by it as the patient" (200b 30— 34). It is 
also asserted that "motion and change cannot exist in themselves 
apart from what moves and changes" (200b 32). Furthermore, "the 
indefinite and elusive character of motion" is recognized and 
explained by reference to the fact that kinesis is located 
between dynamis (potentiality, potency) and energeia (activity, 
actuality) (201b 25-28). Subsequently, kinesis is defined as 
"the actualization of the movable qua movable" (202a 8-9).60 
With all this Plotinus has no quarrel. Although he uses a 
variety of related terms such as odos, agoge. and proodos, all of 
which carry the meaning of process and passage from one state to 
another, his conception of kinesis is basically the same as that 
which Aristotle’s definition reveals (VI. 3. 22. 1-44).
Regarding the kinds of kinësis. Aristotle does not always 
give the same account. For instance, in Physics 201a 8-9 he 
states that there are as many kinds of kingsis as there are of 
being by which he presumably means the ten categories. In the 
Categories the enumeration of the kinds of kinesis includes only 
the following: (1) generation and destruction, (2) increase and
decrease, (3) alteration and (4) locomotion (15a 13-14). These 
correspond respectively to the four categories of ousia. poson. 
poion. and pou. But in Physics 225a 37-38, Aristotle claims 
that, strictly speaking, genesis and phthora are not kinds of 
kinesis which are thus restricted to quantitative, qualitative 
and local motions. Plotinus seems to be in favor of the sixfold 
division as presented in the Categories. To this list he added 
poiein and paschein as distinct kinds of kinesis which is, thus, 
elevated by him to the status of a category of becoming.
On this last point the two philosophers certainly disagree. 
Aristotle never refers to kinesis as a category. For him it is 
an intercategorial concept. Like to on (being) and to hen (one), 
kinesis cuts across many (if not all) categories. It operates 
between contraries (ta enantia). presupposes à substratum 
(hypokeimenon, or hylê). and tends towards an end (telos).6 1
Aristotle also maintains that poiein and paschein are 
distinct categories, since "acting" and "being acted upon" are 
different in definition (to logo), even when one and the same 
activity is involved as in the case of cutting. The road from 
Athens to Thebes may be one and the same but the going to and the 
coming from Thebes is different. For "In these cases we are 
dealing with one and same thing which may be regarded or defined 
from two different approaches. So too with the mover and the 
moved" (202a 20-22). Contrary to this, Plotinus claims that
kinesis deserves to be treated as a category, and more so than 
such Aristotelian categories as poiein and paschein which can be 
considered as its kinds. This point needs elaboration so that 
the difference between the two philosophers will become clear.
According to Plotinus, any candidate for a catégorial 
position should meet three specified criteria: irreducibility to
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any other well-established category, predicability of the highest 
degree, and capability of yielding species and subspecies by 
application of the appropriate differentiae♦ Since kinesis 
passes this test, Plotinus thinks that it should be accepted as a 
catégorial companion to so-called substance together with
quality, quantity, and relation (VI. 3. 21. 1-15). But, if
kinesis is accepted as a catégorial genus, then both poiein and 
paschein, will have to be considered as its species and, 
therefore, they will lose their status as separate categories.
The possibility of viewing kinesis as a kind of pros ti and, 
thus, reducible to relation on the ground that any motion is 
motion of the movable (tinos kinesis), cannot be seriously 
considered, according to Plotinus, because by the same token 
everything else would be reduced to relation. This would make 
the catégorial set twofold, substance and relation, but such a 
wholesale reduction would, inter alia, run contrary to the 
Aristotelian definition of pros ti which Plotinus had accepted 
with certain reservations.62
However, the possibility of considering metabole (change) 
and energeia (act, actuality) as rivals to kingsis for the 
catégorial title is more serious. We may recall here that 
Aristotle had characterized kinesis as áteles energeia
(uncompleted actuality) and had considered genesis not as
kinesis but as a metabole (201b 31-32). Could they not, then, be 
placed higher than kinesis and render null its claim to the
catégorial status? Plotinus is well aware of this serious
challenge and prepared to meet it head on. In a long and
involved passage (VI. 3. 21. 25-47), he argues to the effect that 
either metabolë is synonymous to kinesis or, if their meanings 
differ, "change would be rather a species of movement bëing a 
movement which takes a thing out of itself" (46-47).63
In Plotinus’ view, Aristotle’s characterization of kinesis 
as áteles energeia clearly indicates that energeia is the generic 
concept and áteles the specific difference which determines the 
nature of kinesis. But what the epithet áteles mean in this 
connection, is not clear to Plotinus. In what sense, he asks, is 
kinesis "uncompleted" or "incomplete"? Consider, for instance,
walking which is a kind of locomotion. In the walking process
every step qua motion is as actual as any other, first, middle or 
last. To talk of incomplete motion can only mean that we tend to 
associate walking with the distance to be traversed. Thus, in 
terms of actuality both energeia and kinesis stand on the same 
level, Plotinus suggests, and the same holds for their relation 
to time. For he rejects the claim that kinesis is in time (en 
chrono). while energeia is not (achronos). In a sense, he
insists, neither is "in time" (VI. 1. 16. 14-17).
In the light of the above considerations, it seems clear 
that Plotinus’ arguments are intended to establish the following 
theses: (1) that poiein and paschein can be considered as two
distinct kinds of kinesis ; (2) that a kinesis can be either 
absolute (apolytos) or directed towards something else, e.g. 
walking or singing as opposed to cutting or burning; (3) that in
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the latter case there is one and the same motion, though to cut 
and to be cut, for instance, are not the same as indicated by the 
algos (pain) felt; and (4) that as a result of this difference 
there is a tendency to consider other-directed motions as 
contrary, that is, as active and passive.
Now that this is not the case can be shown by considering 
such activities as.(a) writing, for it would be absurd to say 
that the paper is suffering the impact of the pen; (b) hitting, 
for it is possible that the agent may suffer as much as the other 
fellow if it happen to be the delicate hand of a lady which 
struck the blow; and (c) learning through instruction, for the 
student (the patient) must be as active as the teacher (the 
agent) if the process is to succeed. However, in clear-cut cases 
involving action and passion such as healing or burning, Plotinus 
thinks that "it is the same motion, but looked at on one side it 
will be action, but on the other passive affection" (VI. 1. 22, 
11-13). If so, poiein and paschein can be subsumed under the new 
category of kinesis which came to rival ousia in terms of 
catégorial import in the Plotinian scheme.64
V
To recapitulate, it is evident that Plotinus undertook the 
task of providing a new set of categories for the sensible realm 
by drastically reducing the Aristotelian tenfold set and by 
modifying it in such a way that it became more Platonic. The 
need for such reconstruction was perhaps provided by the fact 
that Aristotle had not treated all of his categories with equal 
care, while Plato had emphasized the importance of kinesis as a 
generic concept necessary for any reasoned account of the 
sensible and the intelligible realms of being.
Plotinus was able to reduce Aristotle’s categories by half 
by arguing that of the omitted six categories (a) pou and pote 
are unnecessary as reducible to the category of quantity or even 
to the category of relation; (b) echein and keisthai do not 
qualify to be considered as categories because they fail to meet 
the criterion of generic simplicity, since they involve items 
which fall under different categories, that is* substance and 
relation; and (c) poiein and paschein. considered as the two 
sides of one and the same coin, can be subsumed under the 
Platonic genus of kinesis with any loss.
Plotinus was the last Platonist to criticize Aristotle’s 
doctrine of categories before it became a part of the Neoplatonic 
synthesis.65 His project of reconstructing the Aristotelian 
catégorial scheme by reduction and replacement was daring but 
unsuccessful in that it was not accepted even by his close 
associates and admirers. For Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Dexippus, 
did not follow Plotinus’ lead on this matter. They initiated a 
new policy of non-confrontation and possible reconciliation of 
Plato and Aristotle. As a result of this policy the categories 
were accepted and defended in toto, that is, without any Platonic 
modification or Plotinian reduction.66
FOOTNOTES
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1. In "The Ontological Basis of Plotinus’ Criticism of 
Aristotle’s Categories," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic 
Approach, R.B. Harris, ed., (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1982), 
pp. 73-83, I have provided an account of what I consider to be 
the basic reasons for which Plotinus could not accept Aristotle’s 
categories.
2. Enneads VI. 1. 2. 29-30. The translation is that of
Professor Armstrong who was kind enough to let me use his 
completed but unpublished typescript of the sixth Ennead. Unless 
stated otherwise, I will follow his translation throughout.
3. This is my rendering of the expression "ta malista onta" 
which Armstrong translates as "those which are most authentically 
beings." For Plotinus* detailed criticism of the Aristotelian 
and the Stoic sets of categories, see VI. 1., chapters 2-24 and 
25-30 respectively.
4. The common title of the three treatises, VI.1., VI. 2., 
and VI. 3., is Peri tön genon tou ontos which clearly indicates 
Plotinus’ ontological approach to the catégorial problem.
5. Plotinus also refers to Plato’s genera in II. 4. 5.,
III. 7. 3., and V. 1. 4. For a concise account of his
interpretation of this doctrine, see E. Brehier’s introduction to 
Ennead VI. 2. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1924-1938), pp. 34ff.
6. The division of this treatise and some others (e.g. III. 
2. and III. 3., IV. 2., IV. 3. and IV. 5., and VI. 4. and VI. 5.) 
was the result of Porphyry’s editorial effort to reach the 
desired number 54 (6x9) which gave the title to the Enneads.
7. As another example of Plotinus’ rigorous defense of 
Platonism, see II. 9., and my "Plotinus’ Anti-gnostic Polemic" in 
Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, J. Bregman, ed., (forthcoming).
8. "For it is absurd to put being under one genus with non-
being, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one 
genus" (VI. 2. 1. 23-24). For a recent appraisal of the function 
of image in Plotinus’ philosophy, see J.H. Fielder, "Chorismos 
and Emanation in the Philosophy of Plotinus," in The Significance 
of Neoplatonism, R.B. Harris, ed., (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press,
1976), pp. 101-121.
9. This certainly sets Plotinus apart from such Middle
Platonists as Albinus, Plutarch, and the anonymous commentator 
who had found the alleged Platonic categories in Timaeus 35Bff, 
in Parmenides 137Cff, and in Theaetetus 152Dff respectively. On 
this see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1977), especially pp. 226 and 279ff.
10. The most important modification, in my view, is the 
replacement of the Aristotelian categories of poiein and paschein 
by the category of kinesis which should be considered as 
Platonic, since it corresponds to one of Plato’s megista gene*.
11. For the relevant bibliography, I refer to W.K.C.
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. VI, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983); and J. Barnes et al.. eds., 
Articles in Aristotle, vol. 1, (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
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1975). For recent discussions, see C. Kahn, "Questions and 
Categories," in Questions. H. Hiz, ed., (Holland, Boston: D.
Reidel, 1979), pp. 227-278; A. Edel, Aristotle (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 97-101; J. 
Moravcsik, "Aristotle’s Theory of Categories," in Aristotle: A 
Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., 1967), pp. 125-145; J. Catan, ed., Aristotle: The Collected
Papers of Joseph Owens (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1981),
especially Chapters One and Two; and my paper "Alternative 
Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Categories," in 
Language and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy, K. Boudouris, 
ed., (Athens, Greece: Achtida, 1985), pp. 163-173.
12. One of the most serious students of Plotinus, W.R.
Igne, has stated that the treatise under consideration is one of 
"the most obscure and least interesting." The Philosophy of 
Plotinus (New York: Longmans, 1948), p. 194. Although this
statement is partially correct, it may account for the paucity of 
works devoted to this part of the Enneads. In English there are 
J.P. Anton’s "Plotinus* Approach to Categorical Theory," in The 
Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1976),
pp. 83-99; and J.M. Rist’s Plotinus :____ The Road to Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), especially pp. 
103-112. Rist concludes that "Plotinus’s view [of the sensible 
object] is basically the original Platonic position" (p. Ill); 
whereas Anton insists that "with Plotinus we have the appearance 
of a radically different ontology of the sensible object. If 
anything, it is non-Hellenic in character" (p. 97). As for the 
Europeans, two important and recently published books should be 
mentioned: K. Wurm, Substanz und Qualität (Berlin: Greyter,
1973); and C. Rutten, Les catégories du monde sensible dans les 
Enneádes de Plotin (Paris: Universitaire de Liege, 1961).
Neither of these scholars discuss in any detail the passage under 
consideration. Wurm’s main thesis is the contrast between "Der 
platonische kategoriale Gegensatz von ousia und poion und die 
nicht-platonische Form seiner Vermittlung in Plotin" (p. 257); 
whereas Rutten attempts to show that in Plotinus "la connaissance 
n’a point d’object" by arguing as follows: "C’est donc a defaut 
de pouvoir identifier la substance 'S. la fonction de genre remplie 
par son concept que Plotin réduit 1’ousia a sa fonction de subjet 
logique. Un idéalisme contrarié se change ainsi en nominalisme" 
(p. 70, repeated on pages 82, 92, 103, 112-115, etc.).
13. About one-tenth of the Enneads is devoted to this 
topic. Regarding the correctness of Plotinus’ interpretation of 
Plato’s genera and the Platonism of Plotinus in general, Anton, 
op. cit., has expressed reservations, contrary to J.N. Findlay, 
"The Platonism of Plotinus," in the same volume, pp. 23-41. One 
of the oddities of interpreting Plato’s megista gene as "genera 
of Being" is that "being" (to on) becomes a "genus of Being!" 
Hence Plotinus* tendency to substitute ousia for to on in the 
Platonic list.
14. For a detailed discussion of the term "genus" and 
"category," see Rutten, op. cit., pp. 42-55. It is significant
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that Plotinus ends his criticism of each Aristotelian category 
with the invariable comment that they cannot function as genera, 
let alone the "genera of Being." On this, see note No. 1 above.
15. In reference to the sensible realm, Plotinus throughout 
the Enneads employs terms like eikon, eidolon, skia, homoiSma. 
all of which connote the notion of image and indicate the 
dependence of the sensible on the intelligible kosmos. To use 
Plotinus’ metaphor, it is as if the sensible "hangs upon" the 
intelligible (anêrtêtai, VI. 5. 9. 36 and elsewhere).
16. For instance, in VI. 1. 2. 1-3, Plotinus states: "And
first of all we should consider what is called substance, 
agreeing that the nature of the sphere of bodies can only be 
called substance ambiguously fhomdnymosl, or should not properly 
be called substance at all but coming into being, because it is 
adapted to the idea of things in flux."
17. That this passage is problematic has escaped the 
attention of both Rutten and Wurm, op. cit. However, Brêhier» 
op. cit., p. 46, wondered whether we have here "un texte de 
Plotin ou h quelque maladroite interpolation." I agree with 
Bréhier that this chapter is difficult to interpret, but even he 
does not seem to take seriously the suggestion that it may be 
interpolated.
18. E.g. in 410a 1, 412a 16, 1023a 31, 1029b 23, 1051b 19,
Aristotle uses the term "to syntheton" to refer to the concrete 
individual substance. But for the same purpose he uses more
often "to synolon" which denotes a stronger union between matter 
and form. Plotinus’ adoption of the former term stresses the
point that eidos is an alien to (the world of hylê.
19. The Plotinian expression "ousia legomenê" is rendered
into English variously by different authors: "pseudo-substance"
(Anton), "ambiguous substance" (Armstrong), "what passes as 
substance" (MacKenna). I prefer the rendering "so-called
substance" because it captures better the irony of the legomenê.
20. Armstrong’s "incidentals" and "consequences" translate 
respectively symbebêkota and parakolouthemata of which the former 
is Aristotelian and the latter either Stoic or Epicurean, 
according to the apparatus criticus of P. Henry and H. Schwyzer. 
Taking into account Porphyry’ testimony, Vita Plotini 14, it 
would be more probable for this term to be Stoic than Epicurean.
21. For Plotinus’ views on hylê and its kinds, see II. 4.
22. The text has peri tauta, literally "those things which 
are about these entities [matter and form]," that is, the 
symbebêkota which, according to Topics 102b 5-8, may or may not 
belong to a given substance.
23. In VI. 3.8. 1-37, Plotinus critically examines the
characteristics of substance, as found in Categories 5.
24. Armstrong here translates topos and chronos which are 
in all probability neglegenter pro en topé kai en chrono, as 
Henry and Schwyzer have suggested.
25. See the attached Tables A and B.
26. The last categories which are reducible to relation 
poson. poion. and kinesis. that is, every category in theare :
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Plotinian list except for ousia.
27. About this expression, see note No. 22 above.
28. Of the reasons which Plotinus produces in arguing 
against an infinite number of beings, the strongest seems to be 
that which echoes Aristotle’s Physics 189a 11-16 and claims that 
the hypothesis renders epistemê impossible (VI. 1. 1. 8-9).
29. This means that, ontologically speaking, Plotinus is
not a monist. There are many different kinds of onta, though 
limited in number. The One qua hypostasis is a different case. 
Like the Platonic Good, the Plotinian One is beyond being. See 
on this The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy. A.H. Armstrong, ed., (Cambridge: At the University
Press, 1970), especially pp. 236-250.
30. As MacKenna renders the expression "gene horismena."
31. But the dispute is not just about numbers. Plotinus 
claims that there is a fundamental ontological difference between 
the Platonic genera and the Aristotelian (and Stoic) categories, 
as we said at the beginning.
32. To what extent this choice determined Plotinus’ 
strategy in reducing Aristotle’s categories from ten to five is 
difficult to tell, since numerical correspondence to the Platonic 
genera is not among his reasons for accepting the fivefold set.
33. Six out of ten Aristotelian categories are excluded 
from the list of Plotinus. The accepted categories are: ousia 
Γlogomene], poson, poion, and pros ti.
34. In contrast to Plotinus, Porphyry states categorically
that the ousia to which Aristotle’s categories apply is the 
composite (synamphoteron). Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. A. 
Busse, ed., (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), vol. IV, part 1, p. 88.
35. Evidently Plotinus attempts to exploit the ambiguities 
of Aristotle’s position regarding ousia. as stated in Categories 
2a 11-14 and Metaphysics 1031b 6-8, 1037a 27-30, 1037b 33-35.
36. But we should not forget that "The whole amalgam itself 
[the sensible so-called substance] is not True Substance; it is 
merely an imitation of that True Substance which has Being apart 
from its concomitants" (VI. 3. 8. 32-34).
37. It is more correct to render the technical expression
ta pros ti as relatives or correlatives rather than relation. 
The former emphasizes the onta which are related, while the 
latter stresses their schesis. This case is parallel to homonyma 
[i.e. onta or pragmata]. with which the Categories opens. On 
this, see H. Apostle, Aristotle’s Categories and Propositions 
(Grinnell: The Peripatetic Press, 1980), p. 51-52.
38. See Ennead II. 6., On Quality. For a good account of
the Stoic categories, I refer to A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy 
(London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 160-163; also J. Rist, Stoic
Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), pp. 152-172.
39. See, e.g. VI. 1. 2.-24.
40. The point is that quantity and quality are said to be
"in" the sensible substance which, in its turn, is "in" place and 
"in" time. On the question of their individuation, I refer to 
G.E.L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis 10 (1965): 97-105; R.E.
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Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle’s Categories,"
Phronesis 14 ( 1969): 31-39; and J. Moravcsik, "Aristotle on 
Predication," Philosophical Review (1967): 80-96.
41. For a detailed analysis of Plotinus’ conception of 
sensible substance, see Wurm, op. cit., especially p. 250ff.
42. But for Aristotle the opposite of this is true. For he 
notes, in reference to species and genera, that by "man" and 
"animal" not a "this" but "a qualified something is meant" 
( Categories 3b 15-17, translation mine). See also Sophistical 
Refutations 178b 38-40, and contrast it to De Anima 412a 6-10.
43. Armstrong’s translation here is awkward but it seems to 
reflect the original text. An alternative and more liberal 
formulation would run as follows: "And the logos of man is its 
essential being, but the bodily existent is rather a qualified 
something than a something, since it is an image of logos. "
44. For Aristotle the individual receives the name and the 
definition of its species (Categories 2b 21-27).
45. See the debate between J. Rist, "Forms of Individuals
in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly, n.s. 13 (1963): 23-31; J.
Blumenthal, "Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?" 
Phronesis ♦ XI No. 1 (1966): 61-81; and A.H. Armstrong, ^ orm,
Individual and Person in Plotinus," Dionysus, 1 (1972): 49-68.
46. The Greek word is hypographe. It is used frequently by 
Porphyry and other commentators on the Categories with reference 
to a description of individuals or of the highest genera which 
cannot be defined by genus and differentia. It is also found in 
Aristotle, e.g. On Plants 819b 16, and De Interpretatione 22a 22.
47. If the general consensus which considers the Categories 
as an early treatise is correct, then this point acquires some 
import, in view of Jaeger’s position about Aristotle’s 
progressive estrangement from Platonism.
48. In the Sophist 255c, Plotinus had found the important 
distinction of onta between the kath auto and the pros alia.
49. To the category of pros ti Plotinus devoted four whole 
chapters in VI. 1., chapters 6-9.
50. In VI. 3. capters 1-20, Plotinus states the conditions 
under which the Aristotelian categories of ousia, poson, and 
poion could be accepted as "genera" of the realm of becoming.
51. Aristotle’s categories are variously rendered into 
Engish by different authors. See Table & for the most common 
renderings. I have preferred the Greek terms in tranliteration.
52. Categories 2a 1-5, in Cooke’s translation, the 
illustrative examples are respectively "in the the market-place" 
and "in the Lyceum", "yesterday" and "last year," "is shod" and 
"is armed."
53. In Categories 8b 27-29, Aristotle classified hexeis as 
a kind of poion, while he considered them as a case of pros ti in 
10b 20-46. A. Edel, op. cit., p. 100, states: "If habits or 
states (hexeis ) are akin to the category of state (echein; the 
terms are linguistically related), the whole field of virtues and 
vices in ethics would be brought within its scope." But by the 




be reducible to the dubious category of echein♦ Such a reduction 
would be more drastic than that of Plotinus.
54. In Categories lb 25, the categories are introduced as 
aneu symplokês legomena.
55. These two categories have been aptly characterized by 
Kahn, op. cit., as "anthropocentric," since they seem to function 
only when the subject of discourse is a man, e.g. Socrates.
56. VI. 1. 23. 4-6. This Plotinian either/or is a false 
dilemma, because in Greek grammar between the active and passive 
voices there is the middle voice, to which Aristotle’s examples 
refer with regard to the category of keisthai (which, by the way, 
examplifies this middle voice).
57. On this point, Aristotle would disagree with Plotinus.
As an Aristotelian category pote does not stand for measurable 
time in general, but for determined time during which something 
occurs. Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 
VIII, (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), pp. 301ff.
.58. Kinesis is the only Plotinian category which exactly 
corresponds to the homonymous Platonic genus. For recent debates 
of this concept, see J. Ackrill, "Aristotle’s Distinction Between 
Energeia and Kinesis." in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. R. 
Bambrough, ed., (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 121-141; 
R. Polansky, "Energeia in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX." Ancient 
Philosophy. Ill, No. 2 (1983): 160-171; P.S. Mano, "Energeia and 
Kinesis in Metaphysics Theta 6," Apeiron 4 (1970): 24-34; and 
L.A. Kosman, "Aristotle’s Definition of Motion," Phronesis 14 
(1969): 58-9.
59. VI. 1. 3. 21-27.
60. The translation of the quotations from the Physics is 
that of P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1970).
61. See, e.g. Metaphysics 1046a-1048b, Nicomachean Ethics 
1174a-1175b, and De Anima 431a-b.
62. In my translation, Aristotle’s definition of pros ti 
reads as follows: "Relatives are called those things which, in 
order to be what they are, are said to be of something else or 
somehow related to something else." In Ackrill’s rendering of the 
same passage we read: "We call relatives all such that are said 
to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some way 
in relation to something else."
63. The term, which Aristotle uses in 222b 16 with
reference to change and which is echoed here, is ekstatike.
64. According to Simplicius, op. cit., p. 306-308, Plotinus 
has been influenced by the Stoics here. Perhaps Aristotle wanted 
to keep poiein and paschein as separate categories because some 
activities do not imply passivity (i.e. noein) or reciprocity 
(i.e. to kinoun akiniton which he mentions in 201a 24).
65. For a complete list of commentators and critics of the 
Categories, see Simplicius, op. cit., pp 1-2.
66. I discuss this problem thoroughly in my forthcoming 
book, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry, which has been 




T A B L E S
Table A. Table B.
P l o t i n u s Aristotle
Elevenfold
matter
form
composite
relation
quantity
quality
in-place
in-time
place
time
motion
Sevenfold
composite
relation
quantity
quality
place
time
motion
Fivefold
composite
relation
quantity
quality
motion
Twofold
composite
relation
Tenfold
substance
relatives
quantity
quality
where
when
acting
passion
having
situation
